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The Sickly State of Public Hospitals
by: Sam Vaknin, Ph.D.
There are many types of hospitals
but the most well known are the Public Hospitals. What sets them
apart is that they provide services to the indigent (people without
means) and to minorities.
Historically, public hospitals
started as correction and welfare centres. They were poorhouses run
by the church and attached to medical schools. A full cycle ensued:
communities established their own hospitals which were later taken
over by regional authorities and governments - only to be returned
to the management of communities nowadays. Between 1978 and 1995 a
25% decline ensued in the number of public hospitals and those
remaining were transformed to small, rural facilities.
In the USA, less than one third of
the hospitals are in cities and only 15% had more than 200 beds. The
100 largest hospitals averaged 581 beds.
A debate rages in the West: should
healthcare be completely privatized - or should a segment of it be
left in public hands?
Public hospitals are in dire
financial straits. 65% of the patients do not pay for medical
services received by them. The public hospitals have a legal
obligation to treat all. Some patients are insured by national
medical insurance plans (such as Medicare/Medicaid in the USA, NHS
in Britain). Others are insured by community plans.
The other problem is that this kind
of patients consumes less or non profitable services. The service
mix is flawed: trauma care, drugs, HIV and obstetrics treatments are
prevalent - long, patently loss making services.
The more lucrative ones are tackled
by private healthcare providers: hi tech and specialized services
(cardiac surgery, diagnostic imagery).
Public hospitals are forced to
provide "culturally competent care": social services, child welfare.
These are money losing operations from which private facilities can
abstain. Based on research, we can safely say that private, for
profit hospitals, discriminate against publicly insured patients.
They prefer young, growing, families and healthier patients. The
latter gravitate out of the public system, leaving it to become an
enclave of poor, chronically sick patients.
This, in turn, makes it difficult
for the public system to attract human and financial resources. It
is becoming more and more destitute.
Poor people are poor voters and
they make for very little political power.
Public hospitals operate in an
hostile environment: budget reductions, the rapid proliferation of
competing healthcare alternatives with a much better image and the
fashion of privatization (even of safety net institutions).
Public hospitals are heavily
dependent on state funding. Governments foot the bulk of the
healthcare bill. Public and private healthcare providers pursue this
money. In the USA, potential consumers organized themselves in
Healthcare Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). The HMO negotiates with
providers (=hospitals, clinics, pharmacies) to obtain volume
discounts and the best rates through negotiations. Public hospitals
- underfunded as they are - are not in the position to offer them
what they want. So, they lose patients to private hospitals.
But public hospitals are also to
blame for their situation.
They have not implemented standards
of accountability. They make no routine statistical measurements of
their effectiveness and productivity: wait times, financial
reporting and the extent of network development. As even governments
are transformed from "dumb providers" to "smart purchasers", public
hospitals must reconfigure, change ownership (privatize, lease their
facilities long term), or perish. Currently, these institutions are
(often unjustly) charged with faulty financial management (the fees
charged for their services are unrealistically low), substandard,
inefficient care, heavy labour unionization, bloated bureaucracy and
no incentives to improve performance and productivity. No wonder
there is talk about abolishing the "brick and mortar" infrastructure
(=closing the public hospitals) and replacing it with a virtual one
(=geographically portable medical insurance).
To be sure, there are
counterarguments:
The private sector is unwilling and
unable to absorb the load of patients of the public sector. It is
not legally obligated to do so and the marketing arms of the various
HMOs are interested mainly in the healthiest patients.
These discriminatory practices
wreaked havoc and chaos (not to mention corruption and
irregularities) on the communities that phased out the public
hospitals - and phased in the private ones.
True enough, governments perform
poorly as cost conscious purchasers of medical services. It is also
true that they lack the resources to reach a substantial segment of
the uninsured (through subsidized expansions of insurance plans).
40,000,000 people in the USA have
no medical insurance - and a million more are added annually. But,
there is no data to support the contention that public hospitals
provide inferior care at a higher cost - and, indisputably, they
possess unique experience in caring for low income populations (both
medically and socially).
So, in the absence of facts, the
arguments really boil down to philosophy. Is healthcare a
fundamental human right - or is it a commodity to be subjected to
the invisible hand of the marketplace? Should prices serve as the
mechanism of optimal allocation of healthcare resources - or are
there other, less quantifiable, parameters to consider?
Whatever the philosophical
predilection, a reform is a must. It should include the following
elements:
Public hospitals should be governed
by healthcare management experts who will emphasize clinical and
fiscal considerations over political ones. This should be coupled
with the vesting of authority with hospitals, taking it back from
local government. Hospitals could be organized as (public benefit)
corporations with enhanced autonomy to avoid today's debilitating
dual effects: politics and bureaucracy. They could organize
themselves as Not for Profit Organizations with independent, self
perpetuating boards of directors.
But all this can come about only
with increased public accountability and with clear measuring, using
clear quantitative criteria, of the use of funds dedicated to the
public missions of public hospitals. Hospitals could start by
revamping their compensation structures to increase both pay and
financial incentives to the staff.
Current one-fits-all compensation
systems deter talented people. Pay must be linked to objectively
measured criteria. The Hospital's top management should receive a
bonus when the hospital is accredited by the state, when wait times
are improved, when disrollment rates go down and when more services
are provided.
To implement this (mainly mental)
revolution, the management of public hospitals should be trained to
use rigorous financial controls, to improve customer service, to
re-engineer processes and to negotiate agreements and commercial
transactions.
The staff must be employed through
written employment contracts with clear severance provisions that
will allow the management to take commercial risks.
Clear goals must be defined and
met. Public hospitals must improve continuity of care, expand
primary care capacity, reduce lengths of stay (=increase turnaround)
and meet budgetary constraints imposed both by the state and by
patient groups or their insurance companies.
All this cannot be achieved without
the full collaboration of the physicians employed by the hospitals.
Hospitals in the USA form business joint ventures with their own
physicians (PHO - Physicians Hospital Organizations). They benefit
together from the implementation of reforms and by the increase of
productivity. It is estimated that productivity today is 40% less in
the public sector than in the private one. This is a dubious
estimate: the patient populations are different (sicker people in
the public sector). But even if the figure is incorrect - the
essence is: public hospitals are less efficient.
They are less efficient because of
archaic scheduling of patient-doctor appointments, laboratory tests
and surgeries, because of obsolete or non-existent information
systems, because of long turnaround times and because of redundant
lab tests and medical procedures. The support - which exists in
private hospitals - from other (clinical and nonclinical) personnel
is absent because of impossibly complex labour rules and job
descriptions imposed by the unions. Most of the doctors have split
loyalties between the medical schools in which they teach and the
various hospital affiliates. They would tend to neglect the
voluntary affiliates and contribute more to the prestigious ones.
Public hospitals would, therefore, be well advised to hire new
staff, not from medical schools, share risks with its physicians
through joint ventures, sign contracts with pay based on
productivity and put physicians in the governing boards. In general,
the hospitals must shrink and re-engineer the workforce. About half
the budget is normally spent on labour costs in private hospitals -
and more than 70% in public ones. It is no good to reduce the
workforce through natural attrition, mass layoffs, or severance
incentives. These are "blind", nondiscriminating measures which
affect the quality of the care provided by the hospital. When
compounded by work rules, seniority systems, job title structures
and skewed grievance procedures - the situation can get completely
out of hand.
The government must contribute its
part. Public hospitals cannot comply or compete with the demands of
national, publicly traded HMOs with political clout and the capacity
to raise capital to finance hyper-sophisticated marketing. Public
policy must be written to support "safety net" institutions. They
must be allowed to organize their own MCOs (Managed Care
Organizations of patients), to insure patients and to market their
services directly to groups of potential consumers. This way they
will save the 20% commission that they are paying HMOs currently. If
they become more efficient and reduce utilization, they will absorb
the full benefits, instead of ceding them to contracting groups of
patients and insurance companies or even to the government's medical
insurance plans. The hospitals will thus be able to construct their
own networks of suppliers and share their risks with their
physicians or with the insurance companies as best suits their
objectives.
An example: a Public Hospital with
its own healthcare plan is likely to make use of all its specialists
and facilities, increase capacity utilization and profits - whereas
today only its primary care, less lucrative, services are used by
independent HMOs.
The government can limit the total
number of healthcare plans available, so that the one propagated by
the public hospital will stand out and not be swamped by hundreds of
other plans. Such a public hospital plan could also be declared the
"healthcare plan of default" - anyone who has not selected a plan
will be automatically referred to and included in the public
hospital plan.
Not every hospital can start an HMO
plan. Only the big ones can support the necessary insurance
payments, the reserve requirements and the marketing and
administrative costs. The paradox is that big public hospitals are
already committed to HMOs, insurers, other patient groups, or
government-sponsored MCOs. These resist the inclusion of hospitals
which own competing healthcare plans - in their networks. This is
natural: a hospital with a plan - is a direct competitor of a
private provider of healthcare management and insurance. Another
obstacle is that governments are very reluctant to encourage the
public sector on account of the private one. This is definitely out
of fashion nowadays.
So, an alternative strategy looks
more viable:
Public hospitals can act as direct
contracting networks. They can team up, pool their resources,
exercise political lobbying, relegate administrative and audit
functions (data processing, claim processing, payment system,
accounting, legal services) to a common centre. This will eliminate
the need for middlemen like the HMOs. These joint networks will be
able to negotiate contracts with other contractors: physicians,
pharmacies, specialized laboratories and so on. This will assist the
public hospitals to preserve a loyal and stable (low churning)
patient base.
Finally, public hospitals are large
employers with political muscle. All they lack is the will to
exercise it. They should do it to force governments to adopt some
unpopular decisions: offer incentives to HMOs which will refer
patients to public hospitals, require HMOs to use all the range of
services (both primary and speciality), compensate public hospitals
directly for nonpaying patients.
But the public hospitals must begin
to behave as public entities: they must open their decision making
processes and make them community-oriented. They must shift from
relying on contractual language to relying on administrative law
(regulations) - except when it comes to employment. In a nutshell:
they should be business oriented, on the one hand - and publicly
accountable on the other.
There is the little matter of
Public Relations and advocacy. Public Hospitals have a terrible
image and they are doing very little to change it. They do not even
collaborate with researchers trying to establish a factual fundament
concerning "safety net medical and social care". In a world where
images count more than realities this may well be the public
hospitals biggest mistake.
Eight Ways to Improve the Operation
of Public Hospitals
A public hospital can lease
physical space or temporal slots, or computer equipment or any other
equipment which suffers capacity underutilisation - to their
physicians for private practice.
The lessee physicians will
undertake to pay the hospital - either in the form of fixed fees or
in the form of participation in the income (franchise arrangements).
They will also commit themselves to
provide community-oriented, non profit services in return for the
right to use what is, essentially, community property.
Another method of using the excess
capacity is to sell it, rent it, or lease it to entrepreneurs who
are not members of the hospital staff. There are many such
possibilities: small laboratories, speciality medical services,
primary care and specialist practitioners. All these would love to
use the superior infrastructure of the hospital. The right to use
this infrastructure can be given in the form of a concession, a
franchise, a rental arrangement, or any other arm's length mode of
collaboration. Professionals are likely to jump on the bandwagon
when they realize that the hospital provides them with a "captive
market" of patient. This is very much like the relationship between
an "anchor" in a shopping mall and the small retail shops
surrounding it. The small shops benefit from the business diverted
in their direction from the big "anchor" outlets.
The next logical step would be to
sell products and services to the community on a commercial,
competitive basis. The hospital does not have to limit itself to the
sale of medical goods and services. It can also sell medical legal
services, use its print shop to offer print jobs, organize its
social services as a profit centre and sell them to the community or
to individuals, offer medical consultancy on a fee per service
basis, even sell food from the hospital kitchen through a catering
service or data to researchers from its archives. A natural
extension of this approach would be "internal privatization".
A hospital is a collection of small
(to medium) size businesses operating under one organizational roof.
Laundry, cleaning, kitchen, the provision of television sets and
telephones to patients, a business centre for the hospitalized
businessmen - these are all profit or loss generating centres.
Internal privatization entails the
transformation of the hospital into a holding company. This holding
company will own and operate a host of corporations. Each
corporation will constitute a separate contractor which will provide
the hospital with a service or a product. Thus, all laundry will be
done by a corporation which will charge the hospital for its
services. The same will go for the kitchen, the printshop, the legal
services and so on. These corporations will employ the former staff
of the hospital. This way, the knowledge and experience accumulated
within the hospital will not be lost. The corporations owned by the
former employees will have a "right of first refusal" in the first
five years following the transformation. The employee-owned
corporations will be allowed to match the best offers in yearly
tenders that the hospital will conduct for the services that they
are offering.
These corporations will also be
allowed to offer their services to other clients. Thus, they will
reduce their dependence on one employer, the hospital. They will
become truly entrepreneurial entities, competing for profits in a
market environment.
A part of the re-engineering
process is to determine which of the functions that the hospital
fulfils are "core functions", indispensable functions without which
the hospital will cease to exist or will change its identity to such
an extent that it will no longer will be recognizable as a hospital.
All other, "noncore", functions should be tendered out (a concept
called "outsourcing"). They should be awarded in a tender to the
most competitive bidders, regardless of their identity and previous
allegiance. The hospital is likely to benefit from the transfer of
functions, in which it has no relative competitive advantage, to
outsiders whose expertise these functions are. This is somewhat akin
to international (free) trade, where each nation optimizes its
resources and passes the (beneficial) results of this optimization
process to its trading partners.
To control this kind of
transformation, medical information management systems need to be
introduced. Many are available and they improve both the quality and
the quantity of data available to the management of the hospital
and, as a result, the decision making process. This will make it
easier for the management to pinpoint which areas require doing
what. For instance: the management of the hospital will be able to
determine what kind of incentives should be provided to which
members of the staff, where could costs be cut and where and how
could productivity be improved.
Finally, a novel concept is
emerging. Universities and hospitals are two important repositories
of human knowledge and experience. Virtually every hospital somehow
collaborates with an academic institution, or with a medical school.
There is symbiosis between hospital
and medical and social researchers.
Hospitals should actively encourage
this. It improves their image, it contributes to their ability to
provide quality services. But should not do it for free. They should
be contractual partners to the commercial exploitation of the
results of research conducted within their premises or with their
co-operation. There is a vast field for pharmaceutical, medical,
genetic and bioengineering research - and a lot of opportunities to
make money for the benefit of the entire community. By not getting
commercially involved - hospitals give up money which really is not
theirs to give up.
About The Author
Sam Vaknin is the author of "Malignant Self Love - Narcissism
Revisited" and "After the Rain - How the West Lost the East". He
is a columnist in "Central Europe Review", United Press
International (UPI) and ebookweb.org and the editor of mental
health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory,
Suite101 and searcheurope.com. Until recently, he served as the
Economic Advisor to the Government of Macedonia.
His web site:
http://samvak.tripod.com |
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