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OPEC's Swan Song?
by: Sam Vaknin
Indonesia's Energy Minister,
Purnomo Yusgiantoro, is unhappy with the modest production cut, from
June 1, of 2 million barrels per day, adopted by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries last week. He intends to demand
further reductions at the June 11 get-together in Qatar.
The deal struck is so convoluted
and loopholed that actual output declines may amount to no more than
600,000 bpd, assuming, miraculously, full compliance. Quotas were
first raised before the war to 27.4 million bpd - a theoretical
level, not met by actual supply. Crude prices, entering a period of
seasonal weakening, dropped further on the news.
With Nigerian and Venezuelan crude
recovering from months of strife, this downtrend may be temporary.
Global excess capacity is a mere 1 million bpd - one fifth its
prewar level. As North American and North Sea production declines,
the importance of Gulf producers soars.
OPEC's eleven countries - Algeria,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq (suspended in 1990, following its invasion of
Kuwait), Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates and Venezuela - control one third to two fifths of
global oil output and three quarters of the far more important
residual demand - traded between net consumers and net exporters.
Residual demand is set to double by 2010.
Still, OPEC - led by Saudi Arabia,
now off the US buddy list - faces fundamental problems that no
tweaking can resolve. Iraq, in the throes of reconstruction and
under America's thumb, may opt to exit the club it has founded in
1960 and, thus unfettered, flood the market with its 2.3 to 2.8
million bpd of oil. Iraqi production can reach 7-8 million bpd in
six years, completely upsetting the carefully balanced market
sharing agreements among OPEC members.
This nightmare may be years away,
what with Iraq's dilapidated and much-looted infrastructure and
vehement international wrangling over past and future contracts. All
the same, it looms menacing over the organization's future.
Far more ominous perils lurk in
Russia, the second largest oil producer and growing. Though the
cheapest and most abundant reserves are still to be found in the
Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Russia are catching up fast. Ali al-Naimi,
the Saudi oil minister may be forced out of office by this apparent
crumbling of the organization's stature.
This would be unwise. Naimi is
widely credited with engineering the tripling of oil prices to more
than $30 a barrel between 1998 and 1999. As the informal boss of the
state-owned Saudi oil behemoth, Aramco, he has already introduced
postwar output cuts. The oil market is so volatile that even
marginal production shifts affect prices disproportionately. Naimi
is a master of such manipulation.
Saudi Arabia regards itself as the
market regulator. It keeps expensive, fully-developed, wells idle as
a 1.9 million bpd buffer against supply disruptions. It is this
"self-sacrificial" policy that endows it with tremendous clout in
the energy markets. Only the United States can afford to emulate it
- and even then, the Saudi Kingdom still possesses the largest known
reserves and sports the lowest extraction costs worldwide.
OPEC is, therefore, not without
muscle. Saudi Arabia had punished uppity producers, such as Nigeria,
by flooding the markets and pulverizing prices. Yet, the
organization is riven by internecine squabbles about market shares
and production ceilings. Giants and dwarves cohabit uneasily and
collude to choreograph prices in what has long been a buyers'
market. These inherent contradictions are detrimental. If OPEC fails
to recruit another massive producer (namely: Russia) soon - it is
doomed.
Paradoxically, the Iraq war is
exactly what the doctor ordered. OPEC's only long-term hope lies in
a geopolitical shift, the harbingers of which are already visible.
Russia may join the cartel, disenchanted by an imperious and haughty
USA - or the Europeans may "adopt" OPEC as a counterweight to the
sole "hyperpower" newfound energy preeminence.
America announced its intention to
pull out its troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. As this major
producer is thrust into the role of the "bad guy" - it acquires
incentives to team up with other "pariahs" such as France and,
potentially, Russia. Controlling the oil taps is a sure way to
render the USA less unilateral and more accommodating.
US interest are diametrically
opposed to those of oil producers, whether in OPEC's ranks or
without. The United States seeks to secure an uninterrupted supply
of cheap oil. Yet, a consistently low price level would go a long
way towards reducing Russia back to erstwhile penury. It would also
destabilize authoritarian and venal regimes throughout the Middle
East.
This unsettling realization is
dawning now on minds from Paris to Riyadh and from St. Petersburg to
Tehran. As the United States looms large over both producers and
consumers, the ironic outcome of the Iraqi war may well be an oil
crunch rather than an oil glut.
About The Author
Sam Vaknin is the author of
Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain -
How the West Lost the East. He is a columnist for Central Europe
Review, PopMatters, and eBookWeb , a United Press International
(UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental
health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory
Bellaonline, and Suite101 .
Until recently, he served as
the Economic Advisor to the Government of Macedonia.
Visit Sam's Web site at
http://samvak.tripod.com
palma@unet.com.mk
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